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Nazi Law as Pure Instrument: Natural Law, (Extra-)Legal Terror, and the Neglect of 
Ideology 
Instrumentalism and Nazi Law 
The impetus for the presentation of the paper that forms the basis of this chapter, at the 2016 
European Society of Comparative Legal History conference at the University of Gdańsk, was 
the conference’s focus on the question of the instrumentality of law. In particular, one of the 
strands of inquiry incorporated within the conference theme was law’s use as an instrument to 
“transform reality”, as a tool to “shape and strengthen national identity”. The particular panel 
in which this paper was presented centred on the nexus of this point with law’s role in political 
projects of total domination, specifically in 20th century authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. 
The subject of this contribution, the role of and relationship between law and ideology in the 
Third Reich, fits well within this given the transformative (and destructive) aims of the regime 
and its strong nationalistic (and racist) element. 
There can be little doubt that the Nazi leadership wished to, and in many respects did, transform 
reality in the Third Reich, and that law was to some extent an instrument at the service of their 
ideological objectives to that end. However, as the theme of the conference attests, law is often 
instrumentalised, whether functionally or axiologically. Simply put, a ruling party or 
government has policy objectives and the law is one of the key normative and institutional 
operators through which it can implement them. This occurs in governments of all political 
stripes and is not limited to so-called totalitarian regimes. In this sense, the particular 
application of this question to Nazi law, and to the other 20th century authoritarian 
administrations considered by the panel’s papers, is uncontroversial: a comparative 
examination of how law was used to further the national interest (as defined by the regime) and 
specifically the role of ideology in this.  
However, it is arguably in the specific case of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes that our 
interpretation of this relationship between policy objective and legal implementation becomes 
obfuscated by an overriding ideological component. When it is an authoritarian ideology at the 
heart of government, such as that in Nazi Germany, we tend to interpret the relationship 
between policy and law, and in particular between governing ideology and legal ideology in a 
different way. The contention of this chapter, therefore, is that in the case of the Third Reich, 
given the discursive development of the academic understanding of the role of law in Nazi 
Germany, there is an a priori theoretical question about the nature of both the concept of 
2 
 
instrumentalism and the concept of “law” at play when we confront the regime that brought 
about the Second World War and perpetrated the Holocaust. This is because the idea of law as 
a blunt instrument, a crude tool, at the service of state power, with little attention to the real 
nature and significance of ideological considerations for law, has dominated our legal 
theoretical understanding of the Nazi legal system. This pure instrumentalisation of law at the 
service of a repressive regime is particularly prevalent in natural law interpretations of wicked 
legal regimes, and especially Nazi law. 
According to this view, it is a case of the Nazi leadership in the early 1930s initially presenting 
as a party of law and order, and feigning defence of the existing German Rechtsstaat in order 
to pacify the ruling and influential conservative elites. Over time this turned into the cynical 
manipulation of the residue of legal norms and processes, primarily to maintain the regime’s 
hold on power and repress any resistance, and ended with the undermining of the legal system 
to leave a state of chaos, barbarity and terror, a state of non-law. The naturalistic belief in the 
necessary connection between law and morality limits the concept of law at play in this account 
to the rule of law, with the consequence that other Nazi measures intended to implement 
ideological objectives, which increasingly emerge as their hold on power strengthens, are not 
conducted through “law” at all and so do not merit historical or theoretical examination as a 
matter of law. This concept of instrumentalism—cynical manipulation of law for oppressive 
purposes—and of law—as the rule of law, the Rechtsstaat – is the predominant hermeneutic 
lens through which Nazi law is understood as a matter of legal theory. Nevertheless, positivism 
too is open to accept the “cynical manipulation” paradigm of instrumentalism in relation to 
Nazi law, just within a slightly broader definition of what constitutes the concept of law. In 
both cases the centrality of Nazi racial ideology to all aspects of the state, and the possibility 
of this ideology manifesting itself in an alternative, but recognisably legal, reality, is 
overlooked, as is an array of recent historiography about other aspects of the Third Reich that 
attests to its importance. 
This chapter is not concerned with broader debates about or between positivism and natural 
law within the legal academy, or with critiquing the complex theories that underlie each 
position generally. Its focus is in part much narrower than that, and in part moves in another 
direction entirely. Its thesis is twofold. The first part is that this particular version of 
instrumentalism and concept of law has often been applied to Nazi Germany and is the 
paradigm that most determines our understanding of Nazi law. The second part is that this 
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interpretation is problematic in light of the historical evidence, both because it oversimplifies 
the nature of the Nazi legal state and because it completely overlooks the role of ideology in 
Nazi law; the relationship “between law as a normative order and the overarching ideological 
framework” of the regime, as the conference panel abstract stated it. Ultimately, the biggest 
problem for legal theory presented by a simplified interpretation of law in the Third Reich, 
focused on crude instrumentalism and the separation between law and non-law, is that it renders 
unnecessary further investigation of the Nazi regime as a matter of law. It excludes from 
relevance for our dominant concept of law a significant and devastating period of European 
legal history and prevents us from trying to make sense of, and coming to terms with, what this 
means for law and legality today. 
In order to demonstrate this thesis, this chapter will examine a number of influential analyses 
of Nazi law advanced since the 1940s, in order to demonstrate their reliance on the approach 
set out above and highlight problems with this. These include Franz Neumann’s Behemoth, 
Lon Fuller and HLA Hart’s positions in the 1958 Hart-Fuller debate, and more recently the 
conclusions of Nigel Simmonds and Kristin Rundle. It will then conclude with some 
preliminary thoughts on applying a broader concept of instrumentalism, such as that implied 
by the conference theme, to Nazi law. 
Instrumentalism in the Behemoth State 
At the heart of an examination of the instrumentalism of Nazi law at the service of its ideology 
is the question of whether Nazi law was really “law” at all; whether the legal system in the 
third Reich was recognisable and valid as law. Some of the most enduring thinking on the 
nature and operation of the Nazi system of government with a bearing on this issue, which 
continues to be influential among historians and others today, comes from two studies by 
political scientists contemporary to the Third Reich: Ernst Fraenkel’s “dual state” theory of 
Nazi legality, and Franz Neumann’s ‘behemoth’ account of the structure of the Nazi state.1 
These two conceptualisations of Nazi government are significant because of the extent to which 
they have subsequently directed the focus of scholarly attention on the constitution of Nazi rule 
towards the “prerogative” aspect of the Nazi state or away from notions of law and legality 
altogether. In both cases, the “non-law” aspect is considered the area most interesting and 
                                                             
1 Ernst FRAENKEL: The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship, Octagon Books, New York, 1969 
[1942]; Franz NEUMANN: Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944, 2nd edn, Frank 
Cass & Co, London, 1967. 
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worthy of study because that is taken to encapsulate the true nature of Nazi Germany; “a 
tyranny, characterized by arbitrary rule, enforced through intimidation and terror”.2 
This is most evident in Neumann’s characterisation of the Third Reich as a Behemoth in his 
book of the same name. This term “depicts a non-state, a chaos, a situation of lawlessness, 
disorder, and anarchy”, and, according to Neumann, Nazi Germany fit this description as it had 
“‘swallowed’ the rights and dignity of man, and is out to transform the world into a chaos by 
the supremacy of gigantic land masses”.3 There is much that can be learned from Neumann’s 
structural analysis of National Socialism and the text devotes a few pages to a discussion of the 
concept of law, positivism and natural law, and the particular manifestation of law in the Third 
Reich.4  However, while he states that Nazi law could be considered law “if law is merely the 
will of the sovereign”,5 Neumann’s evaluation and argument is that Nazi law is non-law, 
because it is not “rational either in form or content”.6 The implications of this for an 
examination of the instrumentalism of Nazi law are apparent, it is “nothing but a technique of 
mass manipulation by terror”:7 
Since law is identical with the will of the Leader, since the Leader can send political 
opponents to their death without any judicial procedure, and since such an act is 
glorified as the highest realization of justice, we can no longer speak of a specific 
character of law. Law is now a technical means for the achievement of specific 
political aims. It is merely the command of the sovereign … Law is merely … a 
means for the stabilization of power.8 
It is a combination of the loss of the specific character of law—a specific ideology of law—
separate and distinct from the political will of the regime, with an analysis of Nazi law focused 
exclusively on violence and terror that denies it the quality of law and renders it a pure 
instrument in Neumann’s analysis.  
The former of these two points is dependent on an acceptance of Neumann’s natural law 
application of the concept of law, and the latter on an ultimately concomitant denial of both a 
specific Nazi vision of legality and the use of law in the Third Reich for anything more than 
                                                             
2 Alan STEINWEIS, Robert RACHLIN, eds.: The Law in Nazi Germany: Ideology, Opportunism, and the Perversion of 
Justice, Berghahn Books, New York, 2013, 1. 
3 NEUMANN: op. cit., vii, “Note on the name Behemoth”. 
4 Ibid. 440-458. 
5 Ibid. 458. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 447-448. 
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terror and repression. While Neumann acknowledges that, in a political sense, law may be “will 
and nothing else”, the version of law he endorses is a rational concept “…determined by its 
form and content, not by its origin. Not every act of the sovereign is law. Law in this sense is 
a norm, comprehensible by reason, open to theoretical understanding, and containing an ethical 
postulate, primarily that of equality. Law is reason and will”.9 On this basis Nazi law cannot 
be considered law, because it undermines the “generality and the abstractness of law together 
with the independence of the judge”:10 
…legal standards of conduct acquire greater significance than before because even 
the restrictions set up by parliamentary democracy … insufficient as they may have 
been, have been removed. By its very vagueness the legal standard of conduct serves 
to bring pre-National Socialist positive law into agreement with the demands of the 
new rules. National Socialism postulates the absolute subjugation of the judge to the 
law, but the standards of conduct make it possible for him to introduce political 
elements even when they conflict with positive law.11 
This reveals the interdependence of Neumann’s preferred concept of law with his description 
of Nazi law as an instrument. The particular ethical standard at the centre of this concept of 
law and the principles that are seen to emanate from that standard, are anathema to the Nazi 
version of law. As this forms the very definition of valid law, Nazi “law” cannot be valid law, 
it must be non-law. Absent of any recognisable normative content, Nazi (non-)law is reducible 
to the will of the sovereign, and this will is intent only on conserving power through terror; 
“true generality is not possible in a society that cannot dispense with power”.12 This appears to 
be the only possibility for a regime intent on being both authoritarian and totalitarian. 
A critique of this is not based on its elucidation of some of the characteristics of Nazi legality—
use of retroactivity, political influence on judiciary, vagueness of the legal standard of 
conduct—in Neumann’s analysis, but rather lies elsewhere and is two-fold. First is not 
accounting fully for the centrality of Nazi racial ideology to the regime, and its potential for a 
Nazi vision of legality. It is argued that Nazi law was not only used for repression, terror and 
the maintenance of power but was also used for the substantive advancement of Nazi policy 
objectives beyond merely stabilising power. It did have its own normative and (un)ethical 
                                                             
9 Ibid. 440. 
10 Ibid. 444. 
11 Ibid. 447. 
12 Ibid. 451. 
6 
 
content. While Neumann hints at the centrality of Nazi ideology in acknowledging that “[t]he 
main function of National Socialist law is to preserve racial existence”,13 the implications of 
this for the nature of Nazi law and how law was instrumentalised by the regime are not fully 
realised in his evaluation. The only function of Nazi law according to Neumann is to spread 
terror to maintain power. 
Second is that the conclusions drawn about the nature of Nazi law emanate from the theory of 
law that is adopted to invalidate the Nazi legal regime, so that law apparently cannot have any 
normative content if it is not the rule of law and accordingly law as terror is the only possible 
alternative. The natural consequence of this, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, is that 
Nazi law is now readily excluded from serious conversations about the nature of law and what 
law may be used for. While it might be appropriate—indeed arguably imperative—to adopt a 
particular concept of law as a method of furthering resistance to a contemporary tyrannical 
regime,14 the enduring influence of an analysis of Nazi law that emphasises its perceived 
lawlessness has acted as an obstacle to our better understanding of how the Nazi regime 
operated as a matter of law even as more and better historical evidence about the institutions 
and governance of the Third Reich has become available since the post-war period. 
In his discussion of the Nazi legal system, while disagreeing with Fraenkel’s views on the 
presence of law in the Third Reich, Neumann makes some reference to the divide between the 
“normative” and “prerogative” state that characterises Fraenkel’s dual state analysis. He notes 
that “[t]he average lawyer will be repelled by the idea that there can be a legal system that is 
nothing more than a means of terrorizing people. He will point out that hundreds of thousands, 
perhaps millions, of transactions in Germany are handled according to calculable and 
predictable rules. That is true”.15 These “‘culturally indifferent rules’ of a predominantly 
technical character”, are a function of “the increasing complexity of modern society” according 
to Neumann.16 He also concedes that “even in the so-called ‘prerogative state’”, we can witness 
the rational application of such technical rules,17 but these are not the sort of laws that Neumann 
is primarily concerned with when drawing conclusions about Nazi legality. 
                                                             
13 Ibid. 452. 
14 Douglas G. MORRIS: Write and Resist: Ernst Fraenkel and Franz Neumann on the Role of Natural Law in 
Fighting Nazi Tyranny, New German Critique, 42(2015)/3, 197-230. 
15 NEUMANN: op. cit., 440. 
16 Ibid. 440. 
17 Ibid. 440. 
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The contrast between Neumann’s behemoth and Fraenkel’s dual state comes in the assertion 
by the latter that the normative state in particular operated in the Third Reich as part of the 
legal system, that there was to an extent law in the Third Reich. The normative state consisted 
of the vestiges of the pre-existing “normal” legal state of affairs and was “an administrative 
body endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, 
decisions of the courts, and activities of the administrative agencies”.18 The prerogative state, 
by contrast, was the arbitrary rule of the government, unrestrained by formal law: “that 
governmental system which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any 
legal guarantees”.19 The prerogative state was parasitic, over time, on the normative state, as 
radicalisation and chaos took hold, and more and more aspects of the state were pulled into the 
arbitrary realm, away from the safeguards of “normal” law.  
It is possible to draw a rough parallel, even if not exact, between Fraenkel’s normative state 
and Neumann’s “culturally neutral” technical rules; and Fraenkel’s prerogative state and 
Neumann’s law as violence and terror. However, while the normative state may have tended 
towards a narrower realm of technical rules, an important feature of it is that it encompassed 
the residue of the pre-existing, Rechtsstaat and legal institutions, which continued to function 
to varying degrees and for differing periods into the Third Reich. Fraenkel argued that the state 
comprised a combination of arbitrariness (the prerogative state) and efficient order (the 
normative state),20 rather than merely arbitrariness, but still made a distinction between the 
legal norms governing society and the exercise of political power in asserting the prerogative 
of the sovereign while emphasising the instrumentalism of the law at the hands of the regime: 
The entire legal system has become an instrument of the political authorities. But 
insofar as the political authorities do not exercise their power, private and public life 
are regulated either by the traditionally prevailing or the newly enacted law … 
Normal life is ruled by legal norms. But since martial law has become permanent in 
Germany, exceptions to the normal law are continually made. It must be presumed 
that all spheres of life are subjected to regulation by law. Whether the decision in an 
individual case is made in accordance with the law or with “expediency” is entirely 
in the hands of those in whom sovereign power is vested.21 
                                                             
18 FRAENKEL: Op. Cit., xiii. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., xvi. 
21 Ibid., 57. 
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According to the “dual state”, the exercise of arbitrary rule, governed by the politics of the 
regime, comes within the prerogative sphere whereas the application of the ordinary law, less 
influenced by political concerns, falls within the normative state. The realm of terror and 
disorder, the lawless realm, is devoid of the sort of legal safeguards that Neumann associates 
with the rule of law. The “normal law”, by contrast, is largely free from influence by the 
ideology of the state.  
While the dual state provides a more differentiated vision of Nazi law than Neumann’s lawless 
Behemoth state, therefore, we still find within it a concentration on the prerogative sphere as 
the political realm of the law, parasitic on the pre-existing legal system. To an extent, of course, 
this was what happened, the Nazi regime gradually changed the law and introduced new, 
Nazified principles and instruments, and the regime continued to operate within both systems 
for a long time. It is problematic, however, to characterise them in this way, as two parallel 
legal systems, because it excludes Nazi legality from consideration as “normal” law and, 
conversely, excludes ideology from the normative state. This tends to return to a position where 
the prerogative state is a lawless, arbitrary, barbarous, law as terror and the prerogative state is 
the rule of law, manipulated and undermined by the regime. 
Fraenkel’s analysis has remained popular among historians of the Third Reich as an 
explanation of how the legal system operated in tandem with the regime,22 and Neumann’s 
account become hugely influential in the framing of the Nazi legal system in the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals,23 and has continued to be the prevailing understanding of Nazi law, at least 
in the Anglo-American historical academy, in the period since. It is possible see some of the 
key characteristics of these analyses in a number of subsequent studies of Nazi law. In 
particular, the application of the natural law theoretical paradigm and the characterisation of 
Nazi “law” as exclusively terror, has resulted in the prevalence of a narrow conception of the 
regime’s aims—as attaining and preserving power— and how law was used to achieve those 
aims—as a form of pure instrumentalism with no independent ideological content. 
Instrumentalism in the Hart-Fuller Debate 
The 1958 Hart-Fuller debate between Lon Fuller and HLA Hart provides an important forum 
in which Nazi law was discussed in terms of legal philosophy, and in which the trope of pure 
                                                             
22 See, for example, STEINWEIS, RACHLIN: op. cit., 2. 
23 Kim C. PRIEMEL, Alexa STILLER, eds:, Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals: Transitional Justice, Trial 
Narratives, and Historiography, Berghahn Books, New York, 2012. 
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instrumentalism and associated characteristics evident in from the earlier scholarly 
interventions about Nazi law, were applied to the Nazi legal system.24 The academic 
significance of the debate in framing the central issues for analysis of the concept of law and 
the terms of the ongoing debate, particularly for the Anglo-American jurisprudential 
community, should not be underestimated, and its merits and influence continues to be eagerly 
discussed.25 The purpose of this section is not to rerun the debate or describe in detail the 
arguments of the two protagonists, but rather to highlight how both Fullerian natural law and 
Hartian positivism endorsed the application of a concept of pure instrumentalism to the Nazi 
legal system. Aside from providing further examples of the prevalence of this approach, this 
also reveals that this approach is not exclusively the domain of natural law, even though it has 
a specific correspondence to that theory. The positivist paradigm too is compatible with an 
historical interpretation of the Nazi regime that views it entirely as a terror state and overlooks 
the role of a constructive ideology in the framing of the legal system. 
The Hart-Fuller debate famously took a post-war “grudge informer” case from the federal 
Republic of Germany as a starting point for a dispute about how best to understand the concept 
of law. The main questions engaged by the debate were the validity question—what are the 
conditions of validity for law—and the separability question—is law necessarily connected to 
morality. Natural lawyer Fuller claimed that law had its own “inner morality” comprising eight 
fundamental principles, with much in common with the tenets of the rule of law, that meant it 
was necessarily connected to morality. As Nazi law did not conform to these principles, Fuller 
argued it was not a valid legal system: 
To me there is nothing shocking in saying that a dictatorship which clothes itself 
with a tinsel of legal form can so far depart from the morality of order, from the inner 
morality of law itself, that it ceases to be a legal system. When a system calling itself 
law is predicated upon a general disregard by judges of the terms of the laws they 
purport to enforce, when this system habitually cures its legal irregularities, even the 
grossest, by retroactive statutes, when it has only to resort to forays of terror in the 
streets, which no one dares challenge, in order to escape even those scant restraints 
                                                             
24 The Hart-Fuller debate primarily consisted of H.L.A. HART: Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 
Harvard Law Review, 71(1958)/4, 593-629; and Lon FULLER: Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to 
Professor Hart, Harvard Law Review, 71(1958)/4, 630-672. 
25 See, for example, Peter CANE, ed.: The Hart-Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010; and New York University Law Review Symposium: Fifty Year Later, New York University Law 
Review, 83(2008)/4, 993-1212.   
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imposed by the pretence of legality—when all these things have become true of a 
dictatorship, it is not hard for me, at least, to deny to it the name of law.26 
Positivist Hart argued that the conditions of validity for law were much less substantial than 
this, with the requirement being that it was correctly enacted according to the internal, formal 
rules of the system, regardless of other characteristics and principles, supplemented by a very 
minimal natural law content. Law and morality could be connected in practice, but were 
conceptually separable, so Nazi law could be considered valid as law. 
This chapter so far has highlighted the connection between natural law, law as terror, and pure 
instrumentalism, and in the above quote from Fuller, it is possible to see some of the features 
of Neumann’s analysis present. Fuller refers to the regime “cloth[ing] itself with a tinsel of 
legal form”, “depart[ing]” from legal standards, “resort[ing] to forays of terror” and 
maintaining the “pretence of legality”. Fuller predominantly examines Nazi law through a few 
examples and with reference to breaches of certain tenets of the rule of law (morality of law), 
such as stability, consistency of administration, and the prohibition on retroactivity.27 Nazi 
Germany is a presented as a regime that attempted to maintain the faҫade of formal legality 
while manipulating and undermining the substance of law, not through ideological infusion of 
an alternative substance into the law, but through resort to terror at every turn.  
For Fuller the question is “[h]ow much of a legal system survived the general debasement and 
perversion of all forms of social order that occurred under the Nazi rule”.28 Nazi “law” was a 
“debasement and perversion” of real law, against which the pre-existing legal system struggled 
to survive. As with Fraenkel this creates a false opposition between “normal” law and lawless, 
arbitrary terror and, as with Neumann, depicts the entire system that results as non-law, such 
was the undermining of what law actually is. Fuller’s natural law paradigm brings with it a 
narrow definition of what constitutes law which was anathema to the Nazi regime. 
Consequently the Nazi approach to law can only be treated as something else entirely, and any 
relationship to actual law could only be in the form of pure instrumentalism—the pretence of 
law used to terrorise, repress and preserve power. While these attributes of the Nazi regime 
should certainly not be discounted, Fuller’s theory gives no consideration to the role of 
ideology in Nazi law. For Fuller, it was not a system “…where lawyers are still at least as 
                                                             
26 FULLER: op. cit., 660. 
27 Lon FULLER: The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, New Haven Connecticut, 1964.   
28 FULLER: Positivism…, op. cit., 646. 
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interested in asking ‘What is good law?’ as they are in asking ‘What is law?’”.29 In reality, 
however, the opposite was the case. The Nazis were not ultimately very interested in what 
constituted law in the formal sense, but only what constituted substantively “good” law; law 
that furthered the national community. 
Hart says very little about the nature of Nazi law, partly because his theory applied much less 
onerous standards for achieving validity as a legal system, and partly because in his case “the 
appearance of law is all that matters”,30 so it was not considered necessary to dig too deep into 
the actual workings of the system. However, the embrace of positivism and with it a broader 
concept of law and legality based on formal and procedural criteria does not, in the case of the 
Third Reich, bring with it a rejection of pure instrumentalism as a lens through which to view 
Nazi law. While it entails a rejection of natural law and the tenets of the rule of law as 
conditions of validity for law, and consequently accepts Nazi law as law, at least in theory, it 
is still possible within the positivist paradigm to interpret that Nazi use of law as pure 
instrumentalism. It is, for Hart as much as Fuller, the manipulation of law for the exercise of 
tyranny with no attention to its underlying ideological substance. In this version too “…the 
Nazi regime in fact depended on a kind of blindness to anything but the formal semblance of 
legality in order to gain legitimacy for its actions”.31 Accordingly, while there is a necessary 
connection between natural law and pure instrumentalism as applied to the Third Reich, this 
does not preclude the possibility of positivism also being associated with this interpretation in 
discursive practice. 
The Instrumentalism of Law in “wicked legal regimes” 
The connection between natural law theory and a particular interpretation of the 
instrumentalisation of law in Nazi Germany is clearly expressed in some of Nigel Simmonds’ 
writings about so-called wicked legal regimes. In his discussion of “evil regimes” in Law as a 
Moral Idea, Simmonds in fact discounts real historical cases of wicked law (including Nazi 
law) from further consideration as serious subjects of study for those interested in the use of 
law for evil ends—and in the battle between positivism and natural law for hegemony over the 
concept of law—because, he argues, it is only hypothetically possible to imagine a regime able 
to “follow the rule of law closely, while making no pretence of governing justly”.32 It is the 
                                                             
29 FULLER: Positivism…, op. cit., 648. 
30 Desmond MANDERSON: Two Turns of the Screw, ed. Peter CANE, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010, 204-205.   
31 Ibid. 
32 N.E. SIMMONDS: Law as a Moral Idea, OUP, Oxford, 2007, 63. 
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pretence of governing justly that is important for Simmonds, and most relevant to the 
connection between natural law and instrumentalism at issue here because, according to this 
theory, wicked rulers exclusively manipulate the law and know they are manipulating the law. 
Simmonds’ aim is to demonstrate the divergence in principle between self-interest and the rule 
of law, and the convergence in principle of moral considerations with the rule of law, and for 
this actual wicked legal regimes are all too easily explained because they only ever pretend to 
follow the rule of law when it suits their ambitions for power. 
While, for Simmonds, there might be examples of individual wicked laws within an established 
historical system, these say nothing about the serviceability of a legal system generally for evils 
ends. In historical instances of wicked regimes (although absent a detailed consideration of any 
particular case), the evil regime is aware that law is good, and knowingly manipulates the law 
for reasons of self-interest, primarily in order to maintain power. This, therefore, only serves 
to enhance the case for natural law against positivism because a wicked regime adopting the 
cloak of legality automatically “invokes an assumed connection between those institutions and 
moral motivation of precisely the kind that the mundane view [legal positivism] seeks to 
question”.33 Consequently, “[w]icked rulers motivated by pure self-interest are unlikely to find 
that observance of the rule of law is in their interests, for a willingness to deploy violence 
outside the bounds of the published rules is a highly effective device for the securing and 
entrenching of a regime’s grip on power”.34 
When addressing hypothetical wicked regimes, which are suggested to pose a stronger potential 
challenge to the natural law paradigm, a similar overarching point is made, that evil rulers are 
motivated by self-interest and are incentivised to manipulate the law (the rule of law) to these 
ends rather than to comply with it for genuine, if malevolent, reasons. For example, wicked 
regimes “typically allow some room for laws and policies aimed at improving the overall 
expectations of the populace, so as to stiffen incentives for compliance with the law”.35 And: 
…while wicked rulers will have good reason to publish rules and enforce them, they 
will have no reasons of self-interest for respecting a most fundamental requirement 
of the rule of law: the requirement that official violence should be used only in 
response to the violation of the law by others. Wicked rulers … will have powerful 
                                                             
33 Ibid., 60-62, 62 
34 Ibid., 100. 
35 Ibid., 95. 
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reasons for departing from this requirement, while the only good reasons for 
respecting the requirement are grounded in moral considerations.36 
Again here, adherence to the principal tenets of natural law, including the necessary connection 
between law and morality – law as the rule of law – is strongly connected to a particular 
understanding of the nature of wicked regimes, including the Third Reich, according to which 
law can only be used as a crude instrument; a means of quelling resistance and strengthening 
power. Whether in a real, historical case of an evil regime, such as in Nazi Germany, or a 
hypothetical case, the regime, motivated by self-interest, uses the cloak of legality to “stiffen 
incentives for compliance” and buttress support among those who value the rule of law, They 
gradually move away from adherence to the rule of law in order to repress resistance and 
maintain power, still motivated by self-interest. Meanwhile, it is not possible to be evil and 
comply with the rule of law because the only “good” reasons for respecting the rule of law are 
moral reasons. 
In this view, as with Fuller, the rule of law is law, and law that does not comply with the moral 
substance we attribute to the rule of law cannot be considered law at all. Logically, Nazi 
policies could not be carried out through legal means, and so Nazi law must be non-law. Law 
is only every instrumentalised by the Nazi regime to further self-interest, ensure the 
endorsement of society and incentivise compliance with the law. And whereas for natural law, 
law is not always an instrument, because it maintains its own separate, inherent morality, law 
in wicked regimes is a crude instrument cynically manipulated by leaders motivated entirely 
by self-interest and only concerned with ensuring control and oppression of the population. 
This application of natural law to wicked legal regimes displays similar characteristics to the 
analyses of Neumann and Fuller, and brings with it similar problems. Chief among these is that 
it underplays the potential importance of ideology to the Nazi project, and the extent to which 
this had a bearing on the type of laws and legal system that were put in place. The attribution 
of pure self-interest as the dominant if not exclusive motivation of the Nazi regime enables a 
clear distinction to be drawn between the “good” of (the rule of) law and the (cynical, 
manipulative) wickedness of the regime. It also means that, according to this world view, law 
must only be an instrument in the hands of the regime. A more complex understanding of the 
motivations and policies of the Nazi regime and the possibility of alternative ethical criteria 
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being used to judge what constitutes “good” law and justice undermines the evidential support 
for this sort of instrumentalism in the case of the Third Reich. 
Again, that is not to say that the Nazi leadership, especially in the earliest years of power after 
1933, did not claim to defend the Rechtsstaat in order to secure and maintain the support of the 
conservative elite and some sections of German society, nor that they did not have a different 
vision for the Nazi legal system, which was not dependent on the rule of law. It would be wrong 
to say the Nazis were wedded to the idea of the rule of law, and Hitler had no interest in 
maintaining the Rechtsstaat beyond that which was necessary. As German legal historian 
Michel Stolleis has stated; 
We know that the National Socialist regime took a strong interest in preserving the 
impression of normality. Its rule was based essentially on its ability to gain the 
cooperation of the bourgeois economic elites and, above all, the civil servants and 
judges who were discontent with the Weimar Republic. Those elites were largely 
nationalistic and antiparliamentarian in their thinking, but they also had a strong 
dislike of open terror. Before they could come to terms with the Nazi regime, they 
needed to be reassured that a national Rechtsstaat (state based on the rule of law) 
would be established, that everything would be done in accordance with the law, and 
that excesses would not be tolerated. … As far as the legal system was concerned, 
the initial strategy of the National Socialists was therefore to change only those 
elements that were indispensable to securing power and demarcating the main 
ideological positions.37 
 The Nazi vision of legality was starkly different to the liberal vision, which presented many 
obstacles to what the Nazis wanted to achieve with German society. But this is not the same as 
saying the Nazis only wanted power for power’s sake, and only used law in order to spread 
terror and maintain power. This grossly underestimates the conviction of the Nazi leadership 
to a broader ideological vision, beyond an authoritarian struggle for power, involving the 
transformation of the German state, society and legal system, as unsupportable, objectionable 
and ultimately disastrous as their vision was.  
The Stolleis quote makes reference to the necessity, even at the start of the regime, to use law 
to stake out its fundamental ideological positions as well as to secure power. A complete focus 
on the latter to the exclusion of the former misrepresents the nature of both law and ideology 
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in the Third Reich. As in earlier cases, this interpretation aligns the implementation of Nazi 
policy through “law” as terror exclusively with the prerogative state and excludes it from the 
ambit of what is considered to be law. It allows us to make the clear distinction between what 
“law” is capable of—discrimination, emergency rule, perhaps some repressive measures—and 
what it is not capable of—mass deportation, large scale killing, the advancement of an 
ideological vision of law completely opposed to the principles of the rule of law. 
Natural Law, Non-Law and Instrumentalism  
When “(non-)law as terror” is the only or predominant paradigm used to interrogate and 
interpret the Nazi legal system, as well as often excluding from legal examination those 
elements considered to fall outside of the realm of law—the lawless barbarity, the criminal 
state, the acts of murder; the Holocaust38—the focus naturally shifts towards the undermining 
of the pre-existing safeguards within the legal state and specifically law’s role in repression 
and persecution in the early years of the regime. The argument presented in this chapter does 
not wish to eradicate this focus as, to reiterate, terror, repression, the destruction of the 
Rechtsstaat and the maintenance of political control, were significant characteristics of the 
regime and, in the case of the first two of these elements in particular, not only in its earliest 
years. Rather it intends to advance the case that it was largely “law” that was used both for 
these purposes and the implementation of even more extreme measures, and that the 
consideration of Nazi law should extend to its normative role in constructing a Nazi identity 
and vision of society; its use as an instrument to transform reality, not exclusively to obliterate 
it. 
However, the focus on law as terror and the themes of lawlessness and crude instrumentalism 
continue to permeate legal theoretical literature specifically focused on Nazi law. This is 
referred to in more recent legal historical engagements with Nazi law. For example, in the 
recognition that “[t]he agreed-on version in general historiography seems to be: the 12 years of 
National Socialist rule are 12 dark years that represent a rupture in German history”,39 the 
acknowledgement that “[i]t may seem paradoxical to speak of law and despotism in the same 
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breath, for to do so raises the dilemma of the existence of law in a system that is on the whole 
unlawful and un-just”,40 or the assertion: 
A book about the law in Nazi Germany might strike some readers as an exercise in 
contradiction. They understand the Nazi regime as a tyranny, characterized by 
arbitrary rule, enforced through intimidation and terror. The hallmark of Nazi 
society, as they understand it, was not law, but lawlessness.41 
An example of a legal theoretical analysis of Nazi law that illustrates a continued focus on 
lawlessness and makes the repressive aspects of Nazi law representative of the legal system as 
a whole, through the conceptual intermediary of natural law theory, is Kristin Rundle’s 
advocacy of a deeper account of Fullerian natural law as it applies to the Nazi state.42 Rundle’s 
thesis centres on a defining legal moment around the time of Kristallnacht in November 1938 
at which point, the claim is, legal discrimination and persecution became extra-legal (non-law) 
oppression and extermination. Based primarily on an assessment of the 1935 Nuremberg Laws 
and some contemporary diary accounts of Jews living in the Third Reich, Rundle argues that 
while in the early years of the regime repression was conducted through legal means, after 1938 
the possibility of acting as a legal subject under the law ceased to exist and Nazi policy was 
implemented outside of the law. 
Despite Rundle’s assertion that “the Nazi legal campaign against the Jews is capable of 
carrying the label of law”,43 this only goes so far in time, and in fact her evaluation of Nazi law 
and application of natural law theory to it has much in common with other approaches 
discussed here that invalidate the Nazi legal system as a whole. Three points are particularly 
worthy of mention. The first is that the analysis is always drawn to the point of non-law, the 
significance of lawlessness to the regime’s worst excesses, which, as in previous cases, denies 
the very possibility of law’s complicity in the implementation of particularly evil objectives. 
Nazi policy after 1938 “…belonged to an extra-legal world of SS directives that remained, at 
all times, contingent on the whims of those who had the power to issue them”,44 which 
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consequently renders those very acts of state that were most devastating uninteresting and 
irrelevant as a subject of legal study. 
The second is that the characterisation of the relationship between the regime and the legal 
system as one of the erosion and undermining of the latter by the former until it is no longer 
law. From November 1938, Rundle argues, the parasitic influence of Nazism on the legal 
system engendered “a degenerative process that involved successively greater departures from 
conventional standards of legality as time progressed”.45 While Rundle does not specifically 
resort to the language of instrumentality, cynical manipulation, the cloak of legality or the 
“tinsel of legal form”, this is the implication of a focus on law being undermined, as opposed 
to it being reconstructed according to a different conception of legality. The narrative of descent 
into arbitrariness and lawlessness remains the same but is shifted in time to a later date. 
Consequently, Desmond Manderson’s criticism of Fuller’s 1958 analysis of Nazi law is equally 
apt here, as this “does not acknowledge Nazism did not merely corrupt a legal system. It 
realised a vision of it…”.46 This ignores the constructive objectives of Nazi ideology in favour 
of the destructive aspects, whereas both were important and both had an impact on the legal 
system. 
The third point—related to the second—is the concentration on law as terror; the use of law 
(and non-law) to repress and persecute. This was undoubtedly a significant and substantial 
function of law in the Third Reich and a central aspect of the implementation of Nazi racial 
policy, and the argument here is not that attention should be drawn away from this entirely. 
However, Rundle’s thesis assumes that criminal legislation directed at Jews is characteristic of 
the whole Nazi legal system, and that component should be exclusively rendered from the 
subjectivity of Jews suffering from persecution by the law. Again, this is undoubtedly 
important, but it does not capture either the whole system of law and especially, as noted in 
relation to the previous point, the relationship between law and the constructive aspects of Nazi 
ideology. It is problematic to invalidate (from November 1938) Nazi law as a system on this 
basis. The importance of natural law theory to the particular direction and scope of this 
argument is also noteworthy. As in other cases, its application goes hand in hand with these 
points, and its implication is that we need not be concerned with how the Nazi regime advanced 
its ideology and transformed the normative framework of society as a matter of law. 
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Some of the characteristics of the literature discussed in this chapter are also ostensible in other 
recent studies of Nazi law that do not necessarily or explicitly adopt a naturalist paradigm of 
the concept of law. In particular they tend to allude to the both law and non-law in the Third 
Reich without expressly addressing or resolving the tension between the two. Thomas 
Vormbaum writes about the “manifest unlawfulness of the National Socialist regime and its 
exorbitant crimes”47 in a history of German criminal law in which it is also asserted, for 
example, that the Reichstag Fire Decree of February 1933 “legitimised the SA’s system of 
terror”.48 Hans Petter Graver, in a book focused on the role of judges in anti-rule of law regimes, 
has also argues: 
From the point of view of legal theory, there must be something flawed with the legal 
system where judges can contribute to atrocities. Either what seems to be a legal 
order is not a legal order at all or there is something wrong with the approach and 
methods of judges in oppressive societies since they depart from their task as 
guardians of the rule of law. The answer may be a combination of both if one claims 
that it lies in the inability of such judges to distinguish between law in the true sense 
and the oppressive non-law of authoritarian regimes.49 
Graver suggests that Nazi law constitutes a version of “oppressive non-law” as the potential 
“flaw” in the legal system that allows judges to be complicit in an atrocity like the Holocaust. 
The Nazi legal regime may have been flawed in many respects, including when measured 
against a particular standard of “good law”, but it is not clear from evidence that this is because 
it “is not a legal order at all” or on what grounds this conditional claim is made. This view is 
advanced alongside indications that the Nazi legal system – at least by some measures – was 
law, although these appear somewhat confused in their mutual compatibility. There is some 
acknowledgement of the role of an alternative ideology in fashioning the legal system, as Nazi 
judges “…sought to construct a coherent and applicable normative body of principles from the 
programme and ideology of the Nazi party”50. The focus, however, is clearly on the 
manipulation and re-purposing—not to say instrumentalisation—of the pre-existing legal state 
into an organ of terror. For Graver, “[t]he Nazi experience shows how a dictatorship can take 
over almost all of the legal norms of a preceding regime and transform them by legal 
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reinterpretation to a system of oppression”,51 and “[t]he continuity of the legal order was 
ensured by maintaining legal language and concepts such as legislation, constitution, legal 
certainty, contract, property, public security, and the like, and by giving them a totally new 
content”.52 
In its incorporation of the idea of legal norms being infused with new ideological content, this 
interpretation entails a more subtle transformation of law than simply the gradual destruction 
of the pre-existing legal state into an extra-legal realm of barbarity and terror. It nevertheless 
continues the thrust of the academic narrative along the lines of pure instrumentalism and law 
exclusively used for terror, while making room for the idea of Nazi law as non-law. There are 
questions here both about the extent to which the Nazi regime did entirely co-opt existing legal 
norms as against the infusion of Nazi-specific concepts and principles into the legal system, 
and about the potential inconsistencies between the different interpretations presented. It may 
not be contradictory to say Nazi law did not measure up to a certain standard of “good law” and 
from that point of view, it can be criticised on grounds of morality, while also saying Nazi law 
was to all intents and purposes a functioning legal system and needs to be evaluated as such 
from an academic perspective. However, it is not always evident, as in the examples of 
Vormbaum and Graver, that this is the view being advanced. It is, often in legal historical 
accounts, the omission to offer a clear legal theoretical interpretation of the nature of the Nazi 
legal system that enables the perpetuation of a narrative of pure instrumentalism. Indeed, it may 
be the prevalence of that narrative, and the other elements associated with it, that make a new 
systemic legal theoretical analysis of the Nazi regime appear unnecessary. 
Ideology, Instrumentalism and the National Community 
The various examples in this chapter of interpreting Nazi law primarily through a narrow 
concept of crude instrumentalism, founded on the twin and co-dependent pillars of natural law 
and law as terror have, as has been asserted, resulted in a neglect of the relationship between 
the overarching ideological framework of the regime and Nazi law as a normative order, as 
well as an undue concentration on the “non-law” interpretation of Nazi law. It has also had a 
further consequence, which has been to overlook, as a matter of legal theory, the important role 
of law in facilitating the realisation of the Volksgemeinschaft—the imagined Aryan “national 
community”—around which Nazi racial ideology and policy was constructed. This represents 
                                                             




the essential “other side of the coin” to the use of law for discrimination, persecution and 
extermination without which these elements are unlikely to have been implemented to the same 
extent. 
The overall impact of a dominant representation of Nazi (non-)law based on pure 
instrumentalism is that “…scholarship may have suffered from the erroneous perception that 
the law did not matter in Germany during the Nazi period”.53 This is not the case, and it is 
important to take steps to overcome this misperception, which involves first the acceptance that 
it is law that we are talking about that was complicit in some way in almost everything in Nazi 
regime up to and including the Holocaust: “‘Nazi law was law, in one form or another, and it 
is at the more nuanced levels of debate that we must address these questions”.54 Second is to 
recognise that this legal system was more than just a system of terror, as important as that 
aspect undoubtedly was, so the Nazi regime did not only instrumentalise the pre-existing 
Rechtsstaat to achieve and maintain power, before dismantling it to leave chaos and 
lawlessness. Third is to seriously examine the idea that the Nazis attempted to infuse law with 
a different normative basis and set of values based on its racial ideology, and to consider the 
implications of this. Then it will be possible to properly consider the instrumentalism of Nazi 
law in the way intended in conference proceedings that inspired this paper; its use to transform 
reality in the Third Reich. 
When assessing how the Nazi regime instrumentalised the legal system in order to implement 
and achieve its ideological objectives, it is important to eschew a narrow concept of what 
constitutes “law” and consider more than what happened to the pre-existing legal regime, in 
the very early stages of the regime, and consequently look beyond crude and cynical 
instrumentalisation for purposes of terror and power preservation. Otherwise we do not see the 
full picture of how law was used to advance and realize National Socialist policy. Those 
limitations both preclude further research into, and understanding of, the part that law played 
in persecution, exclusion, and genocide across the whole period of Nazi rule, and prevent us 
from coming to terms with the complicity of law in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; what 
law, as a concept, is capable of being used for, and how this happens in practice.  
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A concept of validity and legality based on the rule of law or other moral considerations may 
serve an important purpose as a standard of “good” law against which it is possible to measure 
the conduct of a regime in order to establish, for example, if it is indeed “wicked”, and whether 
it might be necessary to consider resistance against it. In the historical case of Nazi Germany, 
however, the regime’s iniquity is beyond reasonable doubt and the time for resistance has 
passed. More urgent now for lawyers and historians is to examine how the regime functioned 
as a matter of law and understand what implications this may have for the nature and operation 
of law generally. The primary aim of this chapter has been to elucidate and critique the 
prevailing interpretation of Nazi law as pure instrumentalism, and there is not space here to 
offer a full account of either the relationship between Nazi law and the overarching ideological 
framework of the regime or what an alternative version of instrumentalism based on this looks 
like. The remainder of this chapter, however, will consider some preliminary thoughts in this 
direction.  
With reference to the idea of a lingering normative state and a racialized, parasitic, Nazified 
prerogative state, Stolleis argues that: 
it is a myth that some areas remained entirely untouched by the political claims of 
the system. Neither the frequently cited land register law, nor the social security or 
tax laws, nor the law concerning debts, property, family, and inheritance was in any 
way immune.55 
This conclusion has two implications for the arguments in this chapter. The first is that law in 
Nazi Germany was not merely the leftover residue of the Rechtsstaat, largely untouched by 
ideology, until it was used and eroded over time by arbitrariness and terror so all that was left 
was pure, prerogative, non-law. Nazi ideology impinged upon and continued to impact all 
continuing aspects of the Nazi regime and changed the legal system as a whole so that it no 
longer looked like what had come before it, but nor did it resemble absolute terror. The second 
implication is that law continued to function in a recognisable—but different—form across the 
spectrum of the system, and this cannot just be seen as a set of technical rules engaged in the 
administration of society. 
The difficulty that Nazi law presents for the concept of law and prevailing paradigms of 
interpretation is that, far from taking purely the form of law and manipulating it for personal 
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(regime) gain absent any substantive ethical content, it was ultimately closer to pure substance, 
lacking the formal requirements of law but with a normative basis founded in Nazi ideology. 
According to this, “the primary Nazi standard of ‘good law’ was taken to be the advancement, 
purification and collective properties thought to be essential to the flourishing of the German 
‘Blood-community’ (Blutsgemeinschaft)”, rather than a formal rule of recognition or 
formalistic principles of morality.56 Instead of the law being used in any way necessary to 
maintain power, the ultimate Nazi ideal was that “ethical principles should be embedded in 
law”.57 The national community was considered to have an ethical compass, a “healthy popular 
sentiment”, embodied in the person of the Führer and embedded in the interpretation of the 
law. This was contrary to liberal principles of legality, and clearly “represented a gross 
departure from the rule of law”58 and the obliteration of its key tenets, but it is not so simple as 
to say these were replaced with disorder, anarchy, lawlessness and barbarity. 
An important consequence of the dissolution of law into ideology was the denial of a distinct 
and independent coherence to legality. This was in some ways the absolute instrumentalism of 
the law to the services of the ruling (totalitarian, authoritarian) ideology, but not merely the 
residue of the Rechtsstaat, and not just in the service of repression, terror and the pursuit of 
power. All law in all forms would have ultimately taken on the formless substance dictated by 
Nazi ideology, with the defective purpose of advancing the national community and supressing 
perceived racial and political enemies. Law in Nazi Germany was used, as an instrument of 
ideology, to construct and foster national and racial identity within the community, and at the 
same time to repress the population and ensure the maintenance of the stranglehold of Nazi 
rule. We can choose to call everything that departed from the pre-existing Rechtsstaat “non-
law” if we so wish, but that misrepresents the history of Nazi rule and denies the complicity of 
law with Nazi ideology.  
The essence of Franz Neumann’s argument about law in the Nazi state, which constituted a 
lawless, anarchic chaos, is that “[i]f general law is the basic form of right, if law is not only 
voluntas but also ratio, then we must deny the existence of law in the fascist state”.59 More 
recently undertaken historical research, however, shows us that “the extent to which there was 
                                                             
56 Carolyn BENSON, Julian FINK: Introduction: New Perspectives on Nazi Law, Jurisprudence, 3(2012)/2, 341-346, 
342. 
57 Herlinde PAUER-STUDER: Law and Morality under Evil Conditions: The SS Judge Konrad Morgen, (2012) 3(2) 
Jurisprudence, 3(2012)/2, 367-390, 371. 
58 BENSON, FINK: op. cit., 341. 
59 NEUMANN: op. cit., 451. Italics in original. 
23 
 
actually an internal logic to the legal system implemented by the Nazi regime is striking. There 
was an underlying ideology at the heart, driving the regime”.60 On the face of it these two 
statements about Nazi law may not appear incompossible, but the way the first analysis is 
argued and its strong connection to natural law theory and the claim that law was only crudely 
manipulated as an instrument of terror, means that it cannot really be reconciled with the second 
assertion. National Socialist ideology provided a rationale and reasoning for the legal system 
of the Third Reich. Therefore, while Nazi law did operate as a tool of repression and an 
instrument of terror, it also embodied a racial ideology that included a vision of legality that 
was often at odds with the Rechtsstaat that had come before it, but should not be denied 
interrogation as a matter of law on that basis. If we want to really understand the 
instrumentalism of law at the hands of the Nazi regime, we need to search beneath the “tinsel 
of legal form” and uncover the darker side of Nazi legal reality. 
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